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of reliance in these cases. It would seem to be the growing trend, however,
to allow the plaintiff in these cases to rely on the defendant's due care to
the extent that the question of contributory negligence is for the jury,
23
without regard to the "proximity" test.

In conclusion, no general prediction can be made as to when a court
will choose to allow reliance by the plaintiff to overcome a defense of
contributory negligence in any particular type of case. Nor call it be said
how a Wyoming court would regard this theory in any of the situations
discussed, with the possible exception of a case like O'Malley v. Eagan.
However, at least it can be said that this theory of reliance is another tool
for use by the plaintiff's counsel in dealing with the problem of contributory negligence. In line with the increasing reluctance on the part of the
courts to apply strict fault concepts in automobile accident litigation, it
should prove a most useful tool.
JERALD E. DUKES

WHAT EVIDENCE SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WHEN
THE DEFENDANT PLEADS GUILTY TO MURDER
IN THE FIRST DEGREE?
Prior to 1915 the statute' in Wyoming on first degree murder provided
only for the punishment of death, i.e., anyone found guilty of murder in the
first degree to suffer death. In that year the State Legislature appended
the words "but the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without
capital punishment' and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified
as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment, at
2
hard labor for life."
One of the first cases to apply this revised statute was State v. Best."
In that case the defendant changed his plea of not guilty to guilty. The
Judge questioned the defendant as to his realization of the import of his
plea, and then announced that evidence would be taken for the purpose
of enabling the jury to fix the punishment. The evidence was heard and
the jury returned all unqualified verdict of murder in the first degree. The
defendant appealed from this verdict, contending that his plea of guilty
23.
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Orth v. Gregg, 217 Iowa 561, 250 N.V. 113 (1933); Mazzaferro v.Dupius, 321 Mass.
718, 75 N.E.2d 503 (1947); cf. Byrne v. Dunn, 296 Mass. 184, 5 N.E.2d 10 (1936) in
which the plaintiff was walking in the street on the right side because of ice on the
sidewalks. See also, Clouatre v. Lees, 321 Mass. 679, 75 N.E.2d 242 (1947) in which
plaintiff, a boy of 16, rode a bicycle out into a street from a driveway between a
store and a filling station. The court held that since there was a school in the
vicinity, the plaintiff "was entitled to take into account the probability that motorists
would regard the presence of the school and the liklihood that school children
would be encountered."

Wyo. Conip. Stat. sec. 5789 (1910).
Wyo. Laws 1915, c. 87 sec. 1. This statute has been carried forward, unchanged,
to the present time. See Wyo. Rev. Stat. sec. 31-201 (1931), Wyo. Comp. Stat. sec.
9-201 (1945).
3. State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P.2d 1110 (1932).

NOTES

was a confession of a killing on purpose and with premeditation, as charged
in the information, and that he should have been permitted to change his
plea when the evidence brought out that the murder had been committed
in the perpetration of a robbery. Citing the case of Harris v. State,4 in
which it was held that the plea of guilty confessed the crime shown by the
evidence, the court held that a plea of guilty could be accepted, and
construed the statute5 to mean that a jury should have the opportunity
to determine the punishment regardless of whether the defendant had
been convicted or has pleaded guilty. The trial court had permitted evidence of previous and unrelated crimes but, since no objection had been
made by the defendant to this evidence, the Supreme Court did not feel
called upon to determine whether or not this was error.
It is clear, of course, that when the defendant pleads guilty of first
degree murder some evidence or at least some information must be given
to the jury, so that they will be able to act intelligently in arriving at a
verdict. Courts have made two approaches to the problem: (1) admission
of all proffered evidence concerning the past history of the defendant;
relevant and irrelevant, on the theory that it would have a bearing on the
punishment to be inflicted, and (2) admission of evidence, according to
the rules of evidence, as in a plea of not guilty.
In the case of U.S. v. Dalhover,6 decided by the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, in determining punishment after a plea of
guilty to the crime of murder while a member of a three man gang (the
other two were killed in an attempt to avoid arrest), the court approved
the admission of the following evidence at the trial: a detailed statement
made by the defendant covering the career of the gang from September,
1935 to October, 1937, disclosing that they had committed approximately
150 grocery store, filling station and drug store robberies as well as three
bank and four jewelry store robberies. The statement included the part
played by the defendant in the commission of the crimes, and was admitted
over the objections and exceptions of the defendant. One judge, dissenting,
wanted to restrict the evidence to that which would be admissible on a plea
of not guilty. This dissenter argued that the effect of the majority's
decision was to place a more severe penalty upon one who pleaded guilty
than on one who pleaded not guilty, and whose guilt had to be proved.
He recognized, however, that admission of all the evidence (as in this
case) might operate to the benefit of a person committing murder in the
first degree, as where the defendant had no previous criminal record.
The rule urged by the dissent in the Dalhover case, supra, was followed
in the Colorado case of Reppin v. People.7 That case involved an attempted "stick-up" and murder by an 18 year old boy. The victim was a
4.
5.
6.
7.

Harris v. State, 34 Wyo. 175, 242 Pac. 411 (1926).
Note 2 supra.
U.S. v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 632 (1938).
Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P.2d 71 (1934).
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taxicab driver. After the defendant entered the taxi, he drew two guns
and ordered the victim to drive to a cemetery. In a scuffle that ensued
the taxi driver was shot, and the defendant drove away in the cab. Before
dying the victim made a detailed statement of the shooting, and at the
trial this statement was admitted as a dying declaration, over objection.
The trial judge admitted evidence of a prior arrest of the defendant, for
conspiracy, in New Jersey. He also admitted testimony by the Chief of
Police (a witness for the prosecution) that the defendant, in his statement
to the police, reported that he had had a "vision" of holding up a hotel
with the aid of about six men. In considering the objection to this
ruling, the Supreme Court of Colorado said that in determining the degree
of murder, the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence when a murder
trial is conducted upon a plea of guilty are the same as those applicable
when the trial is upon a plea of not guilty. The court observed that, as
held in jaynes v. People,s the general rule is that evidence is not admissible
to show that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of
the offense for which he is on trial; no person may be convicted of one
offense by proving him guilty of another. One exception to this rule,
said the court, is to admit evidence of other crimes for the specific purpose
of showing intent. The court found, however, that the evidence of conspiracy, and the "vision," did not show intent, and reversed the lower
court. But the Colorado court in the Reppin case did approve the admission of testimony of offenses of the same character, committed by the
defendant, to show intent, and for that purpose only, Defendant's contention that such offenses could not be admitted because the plea of guilty
raised no issue of intent was rejected. "If such were the case, evidence of
the homicide itself would not be admissible upon a plea of guilty, because
such a plea admits the homicide." 9 In a dissenting opinion, in which two
other judges concurred, justice Burke contended that all the evidence
should be admitted for the purpose of enabling the jury to fix the penalty.
The dissenters thus followed the reasoning of the majority in U.S. v. Dalhover, supra.
In addition to State v. Best,10 the Supreme Court of XVyoming has
considered the problem in one other case-State v. Brown."1 As a starting
point the Court approved State v. Best, which had held that the jury
should determine the punishment where the defendant pleads guilty to
first degree murder. On the Brown case the defendant was a transient
Negro railroad worker who had raped and killed an elderly white woman,
while he was in a drunken stupor. He pleaded guilty to the crime when
arraigned before the court, and insisted on that plea in the face of all
attempts by the Court and appointed counsel to give him any benefit
accompanying a plea of not guilty. In the trial of the cause to determine
8.
9.
10.
11.

Jaynes v. People, 44 Colo. 535, 99 Pac. 325, 16 Ann. Cas. 787 (1909).
Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P.2d 71, 79 (1934).
State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383, 12 P.2d 1110 (1932).
State v. Brown, 60 Wyo. 379, 151 P.2d 950 (1944).
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punishment, the court permitted evidence of the whole sordid crime, e.g.,
the position of the deceased's body, age and character of the deceased, and
th defendant's flight into Idaho to escape prosecution. (It should be noted
that this type of evidence would have been admitted in the course of a
trial on a plea of not guilty.) Defense counsel contended that the result
of admitting this evidence was merely to inflame the jury, and that it
served no other purpose. They contended that in the case of Hernandez
v. State,12 the Arizona Supreme Court has held that no evidence at all
should be submitted to the jury in determining the punishment to be
assessed against the defendant. In that case, however, there had been a
plea of not guilty and a trial to determine guilt as well as punishmentquite a different situation, since the jury had the advantage of the presentation of the evidence in determining the guilt of the defendants. This was
not true of the Brown case. To the contention of the defense counsel in
State v. Brown, Justice Blume replied:
"It may be that the same latitude should not be allowed when
the jury fixes the penalty, which would be permissible when the
trial judge does so but it is quite apparent that the same reason
for examining into the circumstances of the commission of the
crime exists equally in both cases. While, as stated, the discretion
of the jury to impose the penalty of death or life imprisonment
is untrammeled, they cannot, in the very nature of things, bring
in an intelligent verdict, unless they know the circumstances under
which the crime was committed, and all the surrounding facts,
including the age of the defendant, his intelligence, his mental
condition at the time of the commission of the crime, and other
relevant facts which might properly aid the jury in exercising
their discretion. It is hardly credible that the statute contemplates that the jury shall exercise their discretion blindly and
without knowledge of the facts. That must be true in cases in
which the defendant pleads guilty as much so as in those cases
in which he pleads not guilty, and that, too, notwithstanding the
foregoing rule that the jury should be left untrammeled
13 by any
instruction of the court in exercising their discretion."'
The court, in State v. Brown, recognized the existence of the two lines
of authority illustrated by Dalhover and Reppin. However, since the
matter of a criminal record was not involved in the Brown case, this
particular point was not decided by the Wyoming Supreme Court. Consequently, we can only speculate as to how the matter will be handled
by our Courts if it comes up in the future. Realistically, evidence of a
prior criminal record will definitely have a bearing on an ultimate decision
by the jury. Under the Dalhover rule the record would, of course, be
admitted. The Reppin rule would not permit admission of the defendant's
criminal record, over his objection, except for the limited purpose of
proving intent.
The Reppin rule would appear to be more desirable from the follow12.
13.

Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934).
State v. Brown, 60 Wyo. 379, 396, 151 P2d 950 (1944).
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ing standpoints: (1) it follows the comparatively clearly defined rules as
to what evidence is admissible on a "not guilty" trial, (2) it offers an
incentive to the defendant to plead guilty where there is little or no question of his guilt, thus avoiding the necessity of a trial to prove his guilt
and the always present possibility of a "miscarriage of justice." On the
guilty in
other hand, the Dalhover rule is likely to result in a plea of not
14
every instance in which the defendant has a criminal record.
In the ordinary criminal case, after a "guilty" verdict has been found
by a jury or after a "guilty" plea by defendant, the trial judge has almost
unlimited discretion in obtaining "outside" evidence and information for
the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed.' 5 The role of
the jury in setting the punishment for first degree murder, following a
conviction or a plea of guilty, is analogous. On the basis of this analogy
the Dalhover rule should be followed. Putting it another way, our
Legislature has simply chosen to confer upon a jury, in case of a guilty
plea to a first degree murder charge, the same discretion (within limits)
ordinarily possessed by a trial judge in passing sentence.
LEONARD

EMERY

LANG

OIL AND GAS PROTECTION LEASES
The modern practice within oil companies is to examine with great
care the title to lands upon which they hold leases. The reason for such
concern is the improbable but possible chance that the mineral reserves
under the lands will prove to be of unusually high economic value. Because great care is exercised in examining mineral titles, many defects of
a technical nature are uncovered, which defects must of course be corrected or assumed as a business risk. In the past the usual method followed
to cure title defects has been to require a quitclaim of the questionable
interest in favor of the lessor. However, this approach is no longer realistic
since the public has over the years become wary of quitclaim deeds. The
average individual does not wish to alienate unknown but possible interests
which he might hold. As an alternative, the protection lease has been
developed.
A protection lease is simply a "quitclaim lease." In general it provides
that the owner of a questionable interest leases whatever interest he has.
if any, to the lessee, but the lessee is not obligated to recognize any interest
14.

15.

The Dalhover case cited People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R.
1199 (1931) to support admitting testimony of other crimes. The defense attempted
to distinguish this case on the ground that it was heard by a judge, and not a
jury. This distinction was refused on the ground that even if the jury weren't
as capable of discriminating and applying evidence as a judge, which this court
refused to concede, the court stood by to cure any defects, by granting a rehearing,
if it thought there had been a lack of discrimination or misapplication of the
evidence.
Note, Judicial Discretion in Imposing Sentence, 4 Wyo. L. J. 209 (1950).

